OʻZBEKISTON SUVEREN KREDIT REYTINGIDA DAVLAT QARZI BARQARORLIGINING OʻRNI
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.22812153Abstract
XVJ va Jahon bankining 2026-yilgi baholashlari asosida O‘zbekiston davlat qarzining joriy holati hamda uning suveren kredit reytingiga ta’siri tahlil qilinadi. Davlat qarzi ko‘rsatkichlarining belgilangan chegaralarga nisbatan holati, qarz dinamikasiga ta’sir etuvchi omillar hamda qo‘shimcha qarz majburiyatlarining yuzaga kelishi bilan bog‘liq fiskal xatarlar baholanadi. Tahlil natijalari davlat qarzi ko‘rsatkichlari belgilangan chegaralardan sezilarli darajada past ekanini, biroq qarzning YaIMga nisbatidagi pasayish ko‘p jihatdan valyuta kursi ta’siri bilan izohlanishini ko‘rsatadi. Xususan, 2025-yilda davlat qarzining YaIMga nisbati 2,4 foiz punktga kamaygan bo‘lsa, valyuta kursi ta’siri hisobga olinmaganda, boshqa omillar ta’sirida ushbu ko‘rsatkich 1,5 foiz punktga oshgan bo‘lar edi. Bazaviy prognozga ko‘ra, 2030-yilga kelib qarzning YaIMga nisbatini oshirmagan holda qo‘shimcha budjet taqchilligiga yo‘l qo‘yish imkoniyati deyarli qolmaydi. Davlat korxonalari hamda davlat-xususiy sheriklik loyihalari bo‘yicha majburiyatlarning davlat budjeti zimmasiga o‘tishi qarz yukining sezilarli darajada oshishiga olib kelishi mumkin. Olingan natijalar asosida budjet xarajatlari o‘sishini maqbullashtirish, ehtimoliy majburiyatlarni qoplash uchun moliyaviy zaxiralarni shakllantirish hamda xalqaro zaxiralarning oltin narxlari o‘zgarishiga bog‘liqligini kamaytirish bo‘yicha takliflar ishlab chiqilganKeywords
suveren kredit reytingi, davlat qarzi barqarorligi, qarz dinamikasi dekompozitsiyasi, shartli majburiyatlar, fiskal ko‘rsatkichlar, O‘zbekistonReferences
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