DEMOKRATIK TANLOV VA PROGRESSIV SOLIQQA TORTISHNING BARQARORLIGI
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https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.20963500##semicolon##
progressiv soliqqa tortish, chiziqli bo‘lmagan soliq jadvallari, median saylovchi teoremasi, ovoz berish paradokslari, Uncovered Set, Bipartisan Set, endogen mehnat taklifi, o‘yinlar nazariyasi, siyosiy iqtisodiyot, o‘rta sinf##article.abstract##
Ushbu maqolada soliqqa tortish tizimi murakkab bo‘lgan sharoitlarda demokratik qaror
qabul qilish jarayonining o‘ziga xos xususiyatlari tahlil qilingan. Tadqiqot markazida fuqarolar nafaqat davlat
tomonidan taklif etilgan soliq siyosati bo‘yicha ovoz beradigan, balki o‘z mehnat taklifi hajmini ham mustaqil
ravishda belgilaydigan iqtisodiy muhit turadi. Bunday sharoitda daromadga bog‘liq progressiv soliqlarning
mavjudligi saylovchilarning manfaatlari va afzalliklarini yanada murakkablashtiradi. Chunki har bir fuqaroning
soliq stavkalariga bo‘lgan munosabati uning daromad darajasi, mehnat faolligi hamda qayta taqsimlashdan
oladigan foydasiga bog‘liq ravishda shakllanadi. Mazkur muammoni tahlil qilish uchun siyosiy raqobat va
jamoaviy tanlov nazariyasiga asoslangan uchta muqobil yondashuv qo‘llanilgan. Shuningdek, turli malaka
darajalari va daromad taqsimotiga ega jamiyatlarda soliq siyosatining shakllanishini baholash maqsadida
kompyuter simulyatsiyalaridan foydalanilgan. Tadqiqot natijalari daromadlar tengsizligi, mehnat rag‘batlari va
qayta taqsimlash siyosati o‘rtasidagi murakkab bog‘liqliklarni yoritadi hamda demokratik institutlarning fiskal
qarorlar samaradorligiga ta’sirini baholash imkonini beradi. Olingan xulosalar demokratik jamiyatlarda optimal
soliq siyosatini ishlab chiqish, ijtimoiy farovonlikni oshirish va daromadlarni qayta taqsimlashning siyosiyiqtisodiy
oqibatlarini chuqurroq tushunishga xizmat qiladi
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